City University of New York Law Review
Volume 20

Issue 1

Winter 2016

Morales-Santana Before the U.S. Supreme Court: Gender
Discrimination in Derivative Citizenship with Consequences for
Gender Equity, Parental Responsibility and Children’s Well Being
Janet Calvo
CUNY School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Janet Calvo, Morales-Santana Before the U.S. Supreme Court: Gender Discrimination in Derivative
Citizenship with Consequences for Gender Equity, Parental Responsibility and Children’s Well Being, 20
CUNY L. Rev. (2016).
Available at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol20/iss1/10

The CUNY Law Review is published by the Office of Library Services at the City University of New York. For more
information please contact cunylr@law.cuny.edu.

Morales-Santana Before the U.S. Supreme Court: Gender Discrimination in
Derivative Citizenship with Consequences for Gender Equity, Parental
Responsibility and Children’s Well Being
Acknowledgements
Thanks for assistance on this article to the staff of The City University of New York Law Review and to my
colleagues, Professors Ruthann Robson and Natalie Gomez-Velez.

This article is available in City University of New York Law Review: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/clr/vol20/iss1/10

CUNY Law Review Footnote Forum
November 3, 2016
Recommended citation:
Janet Calvo, Morales-Santana Before the U.S. Supreme Court: Gender Discrimination in
Derivative Citizenship with Consequences for Gender Equity, Parental Responsibility and
Children’s Well Being, 20 CUNY L. REV. F. 1 (2016),
http://www.cunylawreview.org/scotus-lynch-morales-santana/ [https://perma.cc/R3J3PQQB].

MORALES-SANTANA BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT:
GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN DERIVATIVE
CITIZENSHIP WITH CONSEQUENCES FOR GENDER
EQUITY, PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
CHILDREN’S WELL BEING
Professor Janet Calvo1
On November 9, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments in
Lynch v. Morales-Santana.2 The case directly addresses the constitutionality
of gender differences in the acquisition of U.S. citizenship by statute
through parentage.3 But the case is infused with issues about the historical
record of discrimination based in gender, non-marital birth, race and
imperialism in U.S. law. The outcome of the case will be legally and
socially significant because of the standards the Court may apply to gender
discrimination and to a remedy for discrimination in the context of
citizenship and because of the societal message sent regarding parental
responsibility for non-marital children grounded in gender stereotypes.
Specifically, the case involves the statutory difference in acquiring U.S.
citizenship at birth outside of the U.S. through an out of wedlock citizen

1

Thanks for assistance on this article to the staff of The City University of New York
Law Review and to my colleagues, Professors Ruthann Robson and Natalie Gomez-Velez.
2
Docket for No. 15-1191 (Lynch v. Morales-Santana), SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/151191.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2016) [https://perma.cc/GH2V-ASB2].
3
Question Presented at 1, Lynch v. Morales-Santana (No. 15-1191), SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES (June 28, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/15-01191qp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KGG6-9RCH]; Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015),
cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (U.S. June 28, 2016) (No. 15-1191).
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father as versus an out of wedlock citizen mother.4 Persons become U.S.
citizens at birth through parental heritage based on the statute in effect on
the date of the person’s birth.5 At issue in Morales-Santana is the longer
time of physical presence in the U.S. required for a non-marital father
before his child is born as versus a non-marital mother, as a condition for
the child’s acquisition of citizenship at birth.6
The statute in effect at Luis Morales-Santana’s birth in 1962 required
that an out of wedlock father have ten years of physical presence in the
U.S., five years of which had to be after the father’s fourteenth birthday.7 In
contrast, an out of wedlock mother had to have continuous physical
presence in the U.S. for only one year at any time prior to the child’s birth.8
The statute also required an established relationship between father and
child through legitimation.9 A similar requirement in an amended statute
was upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in Nguyen v. INS.10 In an
opinion authored by Judge Raymond Lohier, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that the gender-based difference in physical
presence requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.11 The federal government appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.12
Luis Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic in 1962 to a
United States citizen father, Jose Morales, and a Dominican mother. His
parents were unmarried at the time. Luis Morales-Santana was
4

See Brief for Respondent at 1, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. Sept.
26,
2016),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/15-1191-bs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6HM-ABJ2]; see also Brief for Petitioner at 5, Lynch v. MoralesSantana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2016), 2016 WL 4436132 at *5,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/15-1191-petitioner-meritsbrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJP9-B6HC].
5
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2015); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2016).
6
Question Presented at 1, Lynch v. Morales-Santana (No. 15-1191), SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES (June 28, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/15-01191qp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GN6Y-GVED].
7
8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1958); see Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523-24.
8
8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1958); see Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523 n.2 (excerpting the
relevant statutory language from sections 1401(a)(7), 1409(a), and 1409(c)).
9
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994).
10
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). That statute required legitimation or
acknowledgement or adjudication of paternity and a written agreement to provide financial
support. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
11
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523-24.
12
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. Mar.
22,
2016),
2016
WL
1157006,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Morales-Santana-Pet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8GK-B5UF];
Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520 (2d. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 2545
(U.S. June 28, 2016) (No. 15-1191).
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“legitimated” by his parents’ marriage in 1970. He became a legal
permanent resident of the U.S. in 1975 at age thirteen when he moved to the
U.S. with his parents. He has lived in the U.S. since that time, for over forty
years. Before his birth, his father, Jose Morales, was physically present in
Puerto Rico until just twenty days before his nineteenth birthday when he
left Puerto Rico to work for an American company in the Dominican
Republic, then occupied by the United States.13 The Second Circuit
accepted his claim that he was a citizen at birth through his citizen father as
a remedy for the statute’s gender discrimination.14
This is not the first time the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the
constitutionality of the difference in physical presence requirements for
mothers and fathers for derivative citizenship of their children. In 2011, the
Supreme Court divided four to four in the case of Flores-Villar v. United
States.15 Only eight justices considered the case since Justice Kagan recused
herself because she had been the U.S. Solicitor General on the case before
she was appointed to the Supreme Court.16 Flores-Villar thereby resulted in
the continuation of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion17 upholding the
constitutionality of the same statute now in contention in the MoralesSantana case. There is always the chance that Morales-Santana will result
13

Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524.
Id. at 523-24. The case arose in the context of a removal case. The government
claimed Mr. Morales-Santana was removable because of a criminal conviction. He
claimed he was not removable because he was not an “alien” but a citizen at birth through
his father.
15
Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011). For description of and
commentary on Flores-Villar, see, for example, Ruthann Robson, Gender, Equal
Protection & Immigration SCOTUS grants cert in Flores-Villar: Analysis,
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
PROF
BLOG
(Mar.
22,
2010),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/03/gender-equal-protection-immigrationscotus-grants-cert-in-floresvillar-analysis.html [https://perma.cc/VU6A-8HEX]; Ruthann
Robson, Flores-Villar Oral Argument Analysis: Father’s Rights or Citizenship Rights? And
What Remedy?, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (Nov. 10, 2010),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2010/11/flores-villar-oral-argument-analysisfathers-rights-or-citizenship-rights.html [https://perma.cc/QL4V-VHQZ]; Ruthann Robson,
Equally Divided Court Affirms Flores-Villar: Gender Differentials in Immigration Statutes
Remain Constitutional, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG (June 13, 2011),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/06/equally-divided-court-affirms-floresvillar-gender-differentials-in-immigration-statutes-remain-cons.html
[https://perma.cc/MH9K-BH4K]; Ruthann Robson, Revisiting Flores-Villar: Collins and
Kerber,
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
PROF
BLOG
(July
25,
2011),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/07/revisiting-flores-villar.html
[https://perma.cc/J6LS-YNDV].
16
Lisa McElroy, This week at the Court: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (June 15,
2011, 2:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/this-week-at-the-court-in-plainenglish-6/ [https://perma.cc/LFB6-YTPE].
17
United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
14
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in a four to four tie at the Supreme Court, since now there are only eight
justices as the Senate has refused to move forward with the President’s
nomination of Judge Garland to replace Justice Scalia.18 If there is a tie, the
Second Circuit’s decision will stand, as will the current conflict in the
circuits about the issue.
There is also a recent case in which a district court in Texas held the
same statute at issue in Morales-Santana unconstitutional. In VillegasSarabia v. Johnson, the District Court agreed with the Second Circuit in
Morales-Santana and disagreed with the Ninth Circuit in Flores-Villar to
hold that the different physical presence requirements for mothers and
fathers violated equal protection.19 An additional aspect of Villegas-Sarabia
illustrates a further problem with the statute. The U.S. citizen father in this
case was eighteen when his child was born.20 Therefore, there was no way
he could meet the requirement for his child’s citizenship that he have five
years of physical presence after his fourteenth birthday no matter how many
total years of presence he had in the U.S.
In the Morales-Santana case, the U.S. Supreme Court will address
whether the different physical presence requirements for unwed citizen
fathers violates the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, and, if so,
what the proper remedy is for the equal protection violation.21 In its equal
protection analysis, the Second Circuit applied intermediate “heightened”
scrutiny, since the court determined that the statute discriminated on the
basis of gender. The Second Circuit stated, “Under intermediate scrutiny,
the government classification must serve actual and important governmental
objectives, and the discriminatory means employed must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.”22 The court further stated,
“the justification for the challenged classification ‘must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not
rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
18

See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Gardiner Harris, Obama
Chooses Merrick Garland for Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obama-supreme-court-nominee.html;
Russell Berman, Judge Merrick Garland Meets a Senate Blockade, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16,
2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/merrick-garland-meets-thesenate-blockade/474060/ [https://perma.cc/89LM-TGZ9].
19
Villegas-Sarabia v. Johnson, 123 F. Supp. 3d 870 (W.D. Tex. 2015), appeal
docketed, No. 15-50993 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 2015).
20
Id. at 876.
21
Question Presented at 1, Lynch v. Morales-Santana (No. 15-1191), SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES (June 28, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/15-01191qp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZRX8-BWGA].
22
Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 528 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Nguyen v. INS,
533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
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preferences of males and females.’”23
The Second Circuit then turned to the question of whether the
government had shown that the statute’s gender-based distinction was
substantially related to an actual and important governmental objective. The
Second Circuit rejected the government’s two proposed objectives. The first
assertion was that the legislature imposed the distinction to ensure the
biological parent-child relationship and a sufficient connection between the
United States and the U.S. citizen’s child. The court pointed out that Mr.
Morales-Santana’s father took the affirmative step of demonstrating a
meaningful relationship by legitimating his son.24 Moreover, the court did
not see any reason “that unwed fathers need more time than unwed mothers
in the United States prior to their child’s birth in order to assimilate the
values that the statute seeks to ensure are passed on to citizen children born
abroad.”25
The second government assertion was that the legislature imposed the
different physical presence requirements to reduce the level of statelessness
among newborn children. The court found that the avoidance of
statelessness was not the actual legislative purpose and, further, that the
difference in the physical presence requirements was not substantially
related to that goal. Rather, the historical legislative record reflected
legislators’ gender-based generalizations concerning who would care for
and be associated with a child born out of wedlock.26 Further, even if the
potential for statelessness was the legislative concern, gender-neutral
alternatives could achieve that goal, such as providing citizenship to a child
born to a citizen in the event that the child would otherwise be stateless.27
The Second Circuit then decided that as a remedy for the equal
protection violation Luis Ramon Morales-Santana was a U.S. citizen at
birth because his citizen father met the one year of continuous physical
presence required of a citizen mother.28 The court found that this remedy
was most consistent with Congressional intent. The court rejected the
contention that it was unlawfully affording citizenship.29 It held that the
court was exercising its traditional remedial powers “so that the statute, free
of its constitutional defect, can operate to determine whether citizenship
was transmitted at birth.”30 In the court’s view, the judgment in Mr.
23

Id. (citing Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533).
Id. at 531.
25
Id. at 530.
26
Id. at 532.
27
Id. at 534.
28
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 528.
29
Id. at 536.
30
Id. at 537 (quoting Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 95-96 (2001) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
24
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Morales-Santana’s favor confirms his pre-existing citizenship acquired at
birth rather than granting him rights that he did not possess.31 Further, a
federal statute directs that if a court finds that no genuine issue of material
fact about the petitioner’s nationality is presented, the court shall decide the
nationality claim.32
In its brief to the Supreme Court the federal government disagrees with
the Second Circuit on each point.33 The respondent’s brief agreed with the
Second Circuit and amplified the arguments.34 The historical record is of
significant import as the respondent’s brief shows that the statute’s actual
roots in “archaic and overbroad gender stereotypes” negate any bona fide
rationale for the statute’s distinctions.35
In its brief to the Supreme Court, the government, while admitting that
the statute used the gendered terms mother and father, argues that the
distinctions were not based on gender but rather on whether a child had one
or two legally recognized parents.36 The government asserts that when an
out of wedlock child is born to a citizen mother, that mother is the only
legally recognized parent at birth, while the out of wedlock citizen father is
a legally recognized parent only when he legitimizes the child, thereby
affording the child two legally recognized parents.37 It points out that under
the statute a citizen married to a non-citizen whose child was born outside
of the U.S. had to meet the same physical presence requirements as an out
of wedlock citizen father.38 Therefore, the government argues that, upon
legitimation, the statute imposed the same conditions on the out of wedlock
father as if he had been married at the child’s birth.39 In the government’s
view the distinctions therefore were not gender-based. The government
argues that the distinctions are justified because if a child has only one
parent, and that parent is a U.S. citizen, the child will be influenced only by
a person with U.S. citizenship.40 But if the child has two parents, one of
whom is not a U.S. citizen, the child will be subject to the parental influence
of a person with the interests of a “foreign” citizenship.41 The respondent’s
brief argues that the statute is grounded in gender discrimination as the
relevant distinction in the statute is between a foreign born nonmarital child
31

Id. at 537-38.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A) (2005).
33
See generally Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3.
34
See generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 3.
35
Id. at 19.
36
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 10.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 4.
40
Id. at 9.
41
Id.
32
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of an alien mother and a U.S. citizen father who legitimated his child, and a
foreign born nonmarital child of a U.S. citizen mother and an alien father
who legitimated.42
The government further asserts that even if gender-based discrimination
were involved, the statute only has to be justified by a deferential rational
basis review requiring a facially legitimate and bona fide reason because the
discrimination is in the context of nationality.43 The government relies on
its interpretation of Fiallo v. Bell,44 a case that involved the entry of aliens,
and not birth citizenship.45 The Second Circuit stated that Fiallo applied
rational basis scrutiny only to discrimination in the context of aliens seeking
entry into the country, and held that this standard was not applicable to the
context of citizenship.46
But, the government reads Article 1 of the Constitution, which states
that Congress has the authority to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization,47 to give Congress plenary authority to decide which persons
born outside the U.S. should be given derivative citizenship through a
citizen parent. However, naturalization is statutorily defined as conferring
nationality after birth, not acquisition of citizenship at birth.48
The respondent’s brief pointed out that the government offered no
support for the assertion that derivative citizenship is subject to the kind of
“plenary” congressional power that applies to the exclusion of “aliens.” It
asserted that Congress could not constitutionally allow derivative
citizenship, for example, only through fathers or white citizens.49 Moreover,
the deferential rationality standard as part of the plenary power doctrine has
been highly criticized even in the immigration context.50 It is seen as a
judicial failure to uphold important constitutional norms, especially when it
is used as a justification for the imposition of unfortunate domestic negative
social prejudices that have nothing to do with the relationships between the
U.S. and foreign nations and have no place in determinations of who should
be members of the U.S. community.51 Even now, in Morales-Santana, the
42

Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 11.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 17.
44
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
45
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 17.
46
Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 527-30 (2015).
47
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
48
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) (2014).
49
Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 18.
50
See infra note 50.
51
See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY—THE
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2002); GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW
(1996); Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine after September 11, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 701 (2005); Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies
43
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government asserts such authority by citing cases from the nineteenth
century era of Plessy v. Ferguson’s52 racial discrimination involving
similarly archaic stereotypes against Asians.53
The government further contends that the objective of preventing
statelessness meets any equal protection standard applied.54 According to
the government, most countries recognize the unwed mother as the child’s
only parent, so that if an out of wedlock child is born in a country in which
citizenship at birth is solely determined by parentage through a father then
the child would be stateless.55 The respondent’s brief includes a detailed
rendition of the historical record demonstrating the infusion of gender
discrimination into the history of the citizenship law.56 The brief
demonstrates how the citizenship laws were grounded in the now
abandoned archaic notions of coverture and imposed gender roles.57 It
further shows that the historical record did not support the government’s
assertion that unmarried mothers faced a greater risk than fathers of having
stateless children.58
An amicus brief filed by historians in Morales-Santana supports the
Second Circuit’s determination that a concern about statelessness was not
the actual purpose for Congressional imposition of differing physical
presence requirements; rather, this provision as well as other aspects of
citizenship law reflected gender role assumptions.59 An amicus brief filed
by scholars on statelessness concluded that the government’s assertions
Value Family and Marriage?: Immigration Law’s Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 273 (2003); Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity:
Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of Plenary
Power Versus Aliens’ Rights, 41 VILL. L. REV. 725 (1996); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten
More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995); Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision
Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1999).
52
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
53
See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
54
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 33.
55
Id. at 34.
56
Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 2-10. The Respondent seems to be saying to
the government, “Don’t Know Much About History.” SAM COOKE, What a Wonderful
World, on THE WONDERFUL WORLD OF SAM COOKE (Keen Records 1960),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4GLAKEjU4w.
57
Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 41-46.
58
Id. at 30-41.
59
Brief of Professors of History, Political Science, and Law as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, No. 15-1191 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2016),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/AMICUS-History2c-poli-sci-lawprofessors.pdf [https://perma.cc/B25Q-J9UJ].
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about statelessness were without evidence, and that there was, and
continues to be, a substantial risk of statelessness for children born abroad
of unmarried U.S. citizen fathers.60 But even if the government’s assertion
about the status of out of wedlock children born in other countries was true,
it does not justify sanctioning the infusion of those prejudices into U.S. law.
Further, in the government’s view, even if the statute is declared
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection, the courts do not have
the legal authority to grant citizenship.61 Additionally, the government
argues that if the court decides to impose a remedy for an equal protection
violation, then the remedy most consistent with respect for the authority of
Congress would be to extend to mothers, on a prospective basis, the longer
physical presence requirements imposed on fathers.62 The respondent’s
brief presents several arguments against these positions including that the
government failed to identify a single case in which the Supreme Court
contracted rather than extended benefits to cure an equal protection
violation63 and that precluding recognition of citizenship through mothers
who do not have ten years of physical presence would be tantamount to
taking away already conferred citizenship.64
This case has immediate legal consequences for those born to out of
wedlock citizen fathers from 1940 to the present since the difference in
physical presence requirements for out of wedlock fathers as versus out of
wedlock mothers has explicitly existed in statutes since then, but with
different timeframes. For example, the current statute requires an out of
wedlock citizen father to have five years of physical presence, two of which
must be after age fourteen,65 while still only requiring one year of
continuous presence for out of wedlock citizen mothers.66 If the Supreme
Court decides that differences in required times of physical presence violate
the constitution, then presumably these other timeframe differences are also
unconstitutional. The case may also have an impact on future children of
out of wedlock citizen mothers, because of the federal government’s
position that if the statute violates equal protection then the appropriate
resolution is to impose the longer time period of physical presence fathers
face on citizen mothers, rather than requiring citizen fathers to meet the
60

Brief of Scholars on Statelessness as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10,
Lynch
v.
Morales-Santana,
No.
15-1191
(U.S.
Oct.
3,
2016),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/15-1191-resp-amicusstatelesness.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE4M-QASZ].
61
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 48.
62
Id. at 12.
63
Brief for Respondent, supra note 3, at 49.
64
Id. at 56.
65
8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012).
66
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a), (c) (2012).
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lesser time period that mothers must meet.67
The outcome of this case will not only affect persons seeking derivative
citizenship, but it will also convey important messages about gender
equality, parental responsibility and discrimination grounded in out of
wedlock birth.68 These citizenship laws are some of the exceptions to the
twentieth and twenty-first century legal developments that remove
antiquated discrimination based in gender and out of wedlock status.69 Most
of the early citizenship and immigration laws were grounded in the
coverture doctrine70 and discriminated against women,71 thus undermining
the assertion that recognizing the close connection of mothers to children
explains the gender lines drawn in derivative citizenship laws, rather than
out-of-date gender stereotypes. Further, as Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and
O’Connor have pointed out, even if more unwed mothers than unwed
fathers take responsibility for their children, generalized notions about the
way women and or men “are” does not justify distinctions between male
and female United States citizens who take responsibility, or avoid
responsibility, for raising their children, especially when gender neutral
alternatives are available to assure a close connection between parent and
child.72 An amicus brief filed in Morales-Santana by population and family
scholars asserts that the population and social science data show that a
number of nonmarital fathers are regularly in a parental role at the time of
their children’s births, many formally acknowledge their paternity, and
others are parenting their children without the involvement of a mother.73

67

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 51.
The law can reinforce or reject stigma against certain groups. See Solangel
Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital
Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 378 n.207 (2011).
69
See generally Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental
Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292 (2016).
70
Under coverture, spouses and children were subjected to their fathers. Husband and
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generally Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of Coverture, 28
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593 (1991).
71
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460-68 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Kristin A.
Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of
Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2144 (2014); see generally Janet M.
Calvo, Gender, Wives, and U.S. Citizenship Status: The Failure of Constitutional and
Legislative Protection, 9 INT’L REV. CONSTITUTIONALISM 263 (2009).
72
Miller, 523 U.S. at 468-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 471-72, 476-80 (Breyer,
J., dissenting); Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S 53, 74-97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Lynch
v.
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Oct.
3,
2016),
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The facts in the Morales-Santana case and other citizenship cases74
involved fathers who took the kind of significant parental responsibility for
their children that society should encourage, but who suffered the kind of
denigration and emotional and practical harms gender discrimination
imposes.
Moreover, these types of discrimination harm both women and men, as
well as their children. They send the message, sanctioned by governmental
reinforcement of harmful stereotypes, that unwed mothers are responsible
for parenting their children, but unwed fathers are not, and that marriage
makes a difference in societal expectations of parental care-taking for
fathers, but not for mothers.
By imposing full responsibility for the well-being of children on
mothers, the stereotypes harm women as well as men. This type of gender
discrimination preserves a male prerogative to choose whether or not to take
responsibility for children by deciding whether or not to marry the child’s
mother. It makes the responsibility for the father-child relationship
dependent on the relationship of the child’s parents rather than the direct
relationship between father and child. This has a coercive effect on mothers,
signaling to the mother that she must maintain a relationship of his choice
with the father of her child or the child will suffer. And it denies maternal
agency and imposes blame on a mother for failure in paternal choice. The
mother may not want to marry the father of her child for a variety of good
reasons. On the other hand, she might want to marry her child’s father but
he may not want to marry her. Whatever the situation, the mother then holds
the responsibility for the nature of the relationship between her child and
the child’s father. But parental responsibility for the well-being of a child
and the parent-child relationship should not depend on the relationship
between mother and father. Each parent has an independent responsibility
for his or her child.
Additionally, those substantially harmed by discrimination against
parents based in out of wedlock birth are children, who are thereby
perpetually condemned as not worthy, a burden no child should bear.75 At
74

See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S 53 (2001); United States v. Flores-Villar, 536
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2015).
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lawyers who made similar arguments in an early, unfortunately unsuccessful, challenge to
similar “illegitimacy” and gender-based discrimination in the context of immigration laws.
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1277, 1327-30 (2015).

12

CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM

[Vol. 20:1

common law, out of wedlock children were considered nobody’s children,
denigrated as “bastards”76 and subjected to a myriad of legal and social
barriers.77 Perpetuation of disadvantages on individuals because of the
nature of their parents’ relationship when they were born has no place in
twenty-first century America. Therefore, the Supreme Court decision in this
case will have important social as well as legal significance. The Court
should make clear that the infusion of historical prejudices into any part of
U.S. law to the denigration and detriment of any person cannot be
sanctioned under the U.S. Constitution.
The Morales-Santana case is additionally interesting because it
addresses the impact on U.S. citizenship of the United States’ historical
occupation of territories. Luis Morales’s father, Jose, was born in 1900 in
Puerto Rico, which became a U.S. territory after the Spanish American
War. Jose Morales and others born in Puerto Rico acquired statutory U.S.
citizenship through the Jones Act in 1917.78 Jose Morales lived in Puerto
Rico for eighteen years, until twenty days before his nineteenth birthday in
1919 when he left Puerto Rico to work for an American company in the
Dominican Republic.79 Between 1916 and 1924, the Dominican Republic
was occupied by and under the control of the U.S. military.80 Luis Morales
argued that his father therefore had the requisite physical presence since
Jose Morales lived in Puerto Rico for eighteen years and 345 days, and the
twenty days until Jose Morales’ nineteenth birthday were also spent in a
territory controlled by the U.S. government.
The Second Circuit rejected the argument that Jose Morales met the
statutory physical presence requirement because, even though the U.S. had
historical control during its occupation of the Dominican Republic, the U.S.
Proclamation of the Military Occupation of Santo Domingo stated that it did
not destroy the sovereignty of the Dominican Republic.81 The court also
76
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80
See generally BRUCE J. CALDER, THE IMPACT OF INTERVENTION: THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC DURING THE U.S. OCCUPATION OF 1916-1924 (2006).
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rejected the argument that the twenty-day lack of physical presence was de
minimis.82
The legacy of citizenship determinations grounded in U.S. territorial
control of both Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic add additional
context to the history of U.S. citizenship laws that unfortunately reflected
societal prejudices based in race, ethnicity, gender and “illegitimacy.”83
Persons born in Puerto Rico (and in other U.S. territories) are considered
citizens through statutes, not the Constitution, as the “Insular Cases” limit
the full applicability of the Constitution in “unincorporated territories.”84
The reasoning of cases supporting this limitation has been unsuccessfully
challenged as resting on anachronistic views of race and imperialism.85
In Morales-Santana, the United States Supreme Court has the
opportunity to reject the perpetuation of harmful archaic prejudicial
stereotypes in U.S. law.86 The court should do so.
***
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